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Volume XVI Winter 1982 Number 4
FREE SPEECH OR ECONOMIC WEAPON? THE
PERSISTING PROBLEM OF PICKETING*
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINEt
I. INTRODUCTION
A young woman walks briskly along a crowded street in downtown
Boston. She has just won her first jury trial, her spirits are buoyant,
and she has decided to treat herself by buying the elegant pair of
shoes she has spied in the window of her favorite boutique. As she
approaches the store, she notices two small and wizened old men
slowly circling on the sidewalk in front of the entrance. Each has a
large "sandwich board" draped over his shoulders which proclaims
in big red letters:
UNFAIR!
Shoemakers Local 100 on Strike
Against Fashion Manufacturers.
Their Shoes Are on Sale Here.
Help Us! Don't Buy Scab Goods!
The young woman's momentum has almost carried her through the
doorway when her eyes meet those of one of the pickets. She pauses,
winces, shrugs, and turns away. What has happened?
There are several possible explanations. The would-be customer
may have felt physically threatened, but that hardly seems to fit the
facts. Fear would have been much more plausible had the customer
been a frail, elderly person, and the pickets six brawny fellows look-
ing like extras out of On the Waterfront, all brandishing placards on
heavy sticks. Another possibility is that the young woman may have
become intellectually enamored of the labor movement while in col-
lege through her introduction to the classic studies of unionism by
This article was delivered as the fifth Donahue Lecture at Suffolk University
Law School on March 4, 1982.
t James E. and Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B.,
Fordham College, 1951; J.D., University of Michigan, 1954.
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Beatrice and Sidney Webb' and John R. Commons,2 and so was pre-
pared to honor any picket line as a matter of principle. Or, for the
quite different reason that she was a first-generation college gradu-
ate who came from a working class family with strong union roots,
she may have been prepared to honor any picket line, again as a
matter of principle. Or instead she may have been an alert, disinter-
ested member of the public who had read a good deal about the
dispute between Shoemakers Local 100 and Fashion Manufacturers,
and had concluded that the employees were in the right in this par-
ticular case. Finally, the young woman may have simply wished to
avoid an unpleasant human encounter, and therefore shrank from a
head-on confrontation with the pickets.
Legally, the situation can be viewed from various perspectives.
First, the young woman must be protected against physical coercion.
Second, because society has accepted the right of employees to or-
ganize and engage in collective bargaining, it should be prepared to
recognize the ancillary right of unions such as Shoemakers Local 100
to take certain steps which are reasonably calculated to achieve
those legitimate objectives.3 At a minimum, this would seem to
mean that Shoemakers Local 100 could appeal directly to the em-
ployees of Fashion Manufacturers to support it in its efforts to se-
cure recognition and bargaining rights through a peaceful strike. If
necessary for effective organizing, Shoemakers Local 100 should also
be able to enlist the help of other sympathetic groups of employees
or individual members of the public.
At the same time, however, Fashion Manufacturers itself, retail
stores such as the boutique handling Fashion Manufacturers prod-
ucts, their employees and customers, and the general public are all
entitled to be free from undue business disruptions and any other
excessive economic pressures. In the case of the embattled Fashion
Manufacturers, this may mean freedom from some or all of the pres-
sures emanating from outside its own workplace. In the case of the
other parties, this may mean freedom from some or all of the pres-
' See generally S. WBBs & B. WEBB, INDUSThiAL DEMOCRACY (1920); S. WEBB & B.
WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (1920).
See generally J. COMMONS, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (1935).
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (1976) (employees have right to organize and to strike).
Section 7 of the amended National Labor Relations Act guarantees most employees
of private employers in industries which affect commerce "the right to self-organiza-
tion ... and to engage-in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ." Id. § 157. Section 13 expressly en-
sures the "right to strike" "except as specifically provided for herein." National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 452, 457, amended by Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (1976)).
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sures which threaten to enmesh them in a dispute about which they
have little or no direct concern. Striking the appropriate balance be-
tween all these competing interests is the principal function of the
excruciatingly difficult body of law regulating so-called "secondary
boycotts." That will be discussed more fully later.'
Let us return to the young woman who has decided to respect the
picket line and forgo her intended purchase of Fashion Manufactur-
ers shoes. Just as it is indisputable that the law should guarantee
her right to make that purchase without fear of physical compulsion,
I think it is indisputable that the law should guarantee her right to
refrain from that purchase, at least as long as she acts as an individ-
ual member of the consuming public, for whatever reasons are suffi-
cient to her personally. That brings us to the critical issue of the
legal status of picketing. Should it make any difference that the
young woman acted in response to a placard carried by two men
stationed at a store entrance, rather than in response to a newspaper
story, a telephone call from a friend, a paid advertisement, or even a
handbill distributed by the same two men in front of the same retail
shop?
"Peaceful picketing," the United States Supreme Court has said,
"is the workingman's means of communication."' One line of analy-
sis is that, as a means of communication, picketing is free speech
and is therefore entitled to every constitutional protection afforded
other forms of expression. This means that it cannot be subjected to
special restrictions, such as antiboycott curbs, simply because it is
picketing. The opposing line of analysis is that picketing is not sim-
ply speech; it is "speech plus." The "plus" element removes picket-
ing from the realm of pure speech and enables it to be regulated in
ways that the Constitution would not tolerate for other forms of
communication. The rest of this article will seek to determine which
of those two analyses better reconciles constitutional theory and the
realities of picketing.
II. HISTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT: ILLEGAL ENDS AND IMPROPER MEANS
A. Thornhill: "Clear and Present Danger" and Giboney: "Illegal
Ends"
The case that has become synonymous with the concept that pick-
eting is constitutionally protected free speech is Thornhill v. Ala-
bama.' In striking down a state antipicketing statute, Justice Mur-
" See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
5 Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293
(1941).
4 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
19821
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phy declared for the Supreme Court that an abridgment of the right
to publicize through peaceful picketing or similar activity "can be
justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises
under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of
ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opin-
ion."7 That test plainly echoes the venerable rule governing all
forms of expression enunciated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v.
United States:8 "The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."9
Despite the sweeping language of Thornhill, and its apparent
equation of picketing with free speech, the holding was actually a
narrow one. The Alabama courts were prepared to apply a criminal
statute to prohibit a single individual from patrolling peacefully in
front of an employer's establishment carrying a sign stating truth-
fully that the employer did not employ union labor.10 Because the
statute provided for no exceptions, the Supreme Court held it inva-
lid on its face.11
The most definitive statement the Supreme Court has made on
the constitutionally allowable limitations on picketing may have
been its unanimous decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co.12 There the Court sustained a state court injunction against
peaceful picketing whose "sole, unlawful immediate objective" was
to induce wholesale distributors to agree with a union not to sell ice
to nonunion peddlers.1" This effort was in violation of a state statute
forbidding combinations in restraint of trade.' Because the validity
of the state antitrust legislation was accepted, it was an easy step to
conclude that "placards used as an essential and inseparable part of
a grave offense against an important public law cannot immunize
that unlawful conduct from state control."1 5
So too, Bonnie and Clyde's oral instructions to their confederates
Id. at 104-05.
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
I d. at 52; cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (quoting with
approval Judge Learned Hand's inquiry "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger").
'a See 310 U.S. at 91-92, 91 n.1 (quoting anti-picketing statute and discussing lower
court history of case).
Id. at 101, 105.
" 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
Id. at 502.
14 Id. at 495.
Is Id. at 502.
[Vol. XVI:883
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may have been speech in the most conventional sense. Nevertheless,
as long as they were in furtherance of a conspiracy to rob a bank,
they would not be immune from the regulatory power of govern-
ment."' With Giboney as the touchstone, the critical factor became
the end pursued rather than the means employed. If the end is un-
lawful, picketing or any other form of expression in direct further-
ance of it can be restricted. If the end, for example a customer's
refraining from making a particular purchase, is lawful and cannot
constitutionally be declared unlawful, then under this view peaceful
picketing, and any other form of expression in furtherance of it, can-
not constitutionally be forbidden.
As a general approach, this is hardly a novel theory. Over twenty-
five years ago, Professor Edgar A. Jones, Jr. of the University of Cal-
ifornia at Los Angeles stated: "Picketing, like any other speech, is
protected by the Constitution-as a means; however, like other
speech, it will not be protected when used for the purpose of accom-
plishing an unlawful end."' 7 The soundness of this analysis can be
tested by asking whether a court would have decided differently any
case in which a ban on peaceful picketing was upheld had the ban
applied to any other type of communication, at the same time and
place as the message conveyed by the pickets.
In certain situations, of course, picketing might present a clear
and present danger that a substantive evil would occur, while an
oral or written communication delivered far from the scene or
phrased in abstract terms might not. But that is arguably a mere
function of the time, place and specificity of the message conveyed
by the picketing (including any peculiar significance attached to it
by prearrangement among a particular group) rather than something
inherent in the nature of the conduct itself. Any other type of
speech or advocacy might likewise create or not create a clear and
present danger which can be declared unlawful, depending on its
tendency to generate certain proscribed behavior." Until 1980, every
10 See, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915) (statute condemning
speech which encourages violations of law constitutionally permissible).
,7 Jones, Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! - Amidst Confusion, A Con-
stant Principle, 29 S. CAL. L. Rav. 137, 157 (1956); see also Jones, The Right to
Picket-Twilight Zone of the Constitution, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 995, 1028 (1954). For a
vigorous exposition of the contrary point of view, see C. GREGORY & H. KATz, LABOR
AND THE LAW 289-329 (3d ed. 1979).
,8 Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (statute can prohibit ad-
vocating forcible overthrow of government when existence of conspiracy creates dan-
ger of action) with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (statute prohibiting
advocacy of overthrow of government was limited to advocacy of specific acts and did
not cover advocacy of overthrow as abstract doctrine). See Gompers v. Buck's Stove
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (on the status of unfair list used to "signal"
19821
HeinOnline  -- 16 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 887 1982
SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court holding regarding the status of picketing subsequent
to Thornhill and Giboney can be explained under the "clear dan-
ger" and "unlawful objectives" standards of those decisions, in spite
of occasional language that suggests otherwise. 9
B. Characterization of Objectives
In several cases in which the Supreme Court has sustained a ban
on peaceful picketing, the unlawful end or substantive evil pro-
scribed by governmental authority was the "exertion of concerted
pressure 2 0 by employees, typically acting subject to union discipline
or loyalties, to compel a person to do an act that a constitutionally
valid public policy has declared should be left to his voluntary de-
termination."1 The picketing was either "a signal in the nature of an
order to the members of the affiliated unions '' 22 or a "bare instiga-
tion '28 by organized employees to force the person to take the action
desired by the union. 4 An example is picketing aimed at the enlist-
ment of union deliverymen and union patrons to force a self-em-
ployed entrepreneur to abide by union working conditions.2 5 In
other cases the act which the union wanted someone to perform was
boycott by unionized employees acting in concert); cf. Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the
Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574, 601 (1951) ("the Court cannot long distinguish
between the picket line and the unfair list").
19 The results in these picketing cases were not all necessarily sound. In several
instances the Supreme Court viewed the factual situation differently from the way I
think it should have been viewed. But this does not affect my contention that, assum-
ing arguendo the correctness of the Court's interpretation of the facts and of its eval-
uation of the object of the picketing, there was undeviating decisional consistency for
forty years following Thornhill v. Alabama on the constitutional status of picketing.
Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 726 (1942) (emphasis
supplied).
23 See, e.g., id. at 726-28.
" See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 678 (1951)
(unfair to permit union to order picket against general contractor to fire nonunion
subcontractor).
"s See IBEW Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 701, 704 (1951).
" See supra notes 20-23. The cases cited in notes 20 through 23 may be character-
ized as involving secondary boycotts. A "neutral" or "secondary" party was being
pressured by a combination of employees to cease doing business with a "primary
party" - the real object of the union's grievance. In Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke,
339 U.S. 470 (1950), the picketers sought to get union drivers and customers to com-
pel a self-employer to accept union standards. Id. at 471-72. In every instance some-
one had a special interest of sufficient value-his status as a supposed "neutral" or as
an independent sole entrepreneur-that the Court felt government could, within the
strictures of the Constitution, protect him against being forced to relinquish it by a
combination of employees responding to group discipline.
" See Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 472 (1950); supra note 24
(describing circumstances of Teamsters Local 309).
[Vol. XVI:883
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itself deemed unlawful, as in Giboney. For instance, the object of
the picketing might be to compel the employer to engage in racial
discrimination or to commit an unfair labor practice against its own
employees.26 In those circumstances even a direct, noncoercive in-
ducement of the act could presumably have been prohibited.
The Achilles heel of the "unlawful objectives" test is that it en-
ables a willing judiciary to rationalize almost any restriction on pick-
eting by a hasty acceptance of a governmental characterization of
the purpose of the picketing as illegal. Some members of the Su-
preme Court thought this occurred in Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt,
Inc.2 7 In that case, a 5-3 majority upheld a state court injunction
against peaceful organizational picketing on the grounds that the
purpose of the picketing was to coerce the employer to force its em-
ployees to join the union.28 Carried to its logical conclusion, that ap-
proach could be used to justify the prohibition of almost any organi-
zational picketing and thereby overrule Thornhill. Perhaps the
Court found it significant that the employer in Vogt was a gravel
pit, where the primary addressees of the pickets were unionized
truckers and not individual consumers acting on their own.
In any event, in the forty years following Thornhill, whenever the
Supreme Court dealt with peaceful picketing which sought the per-
formance of a lawful act by the immediate or ultimate target of the
picketing, uncoerced by organized employees or a group acting in
concert, it consistently sustained the constitutional right of the pick-
eters "to advise customers and prospective customers . . . and
thereby to induce such customers not to patronize" the target busi-
nesses.2 9 Toward the end of the Warren Court years, Justice Mar-
e See Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 285-86 (1957) (picketing to
have employer force his employees to join a union); Plumbers Local 10 v. Graham,
345 U.S. 192, 194-95 (1953) (picketing to have employer require union membership as
condition of employment, in violation of state right-to-work law); Building Serv. Em-
ployees Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 533-34 (1950) (picketing to have employer
force his employees to join union, contrary to state statute forbidding such employer
coercion); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 461-62 (1950) (picketing to have
employer practice racial discrimination, contrary to state policy).
27 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
U Id. at 295.
"o Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 99; see also Teamsters Local 795 v. Newell,
356 U.S. 341, 341 (1958) (jurisdiction of NLRB not limited to employer-employee
situations), rev'g per curiam, 181 Kan. 898, 317 P.2d 817 (1957); Cafeteria Employees
Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 294-96 (1943) (workmen can peacefully picket in
public though not employed by target of picket); Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers
Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 772-75 (1942) (nonemployee union may picket busi-
ness); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1941) (first amendment does not limit
allowable picketing to situations between employer and employees); cf. NLRB v.
Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 [Tree Fruits], 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964) (allows
1982]
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shall summed up the teachings of the Supreme Court by declaring
that the cases in which picketing bans had been approved "involved
picketing that was found either to have been directed at an illegal
end . . . or to have been directed to coercing a decision by an em-
ployer which, although in itself legal, could validly be required by
the State to be left to the employer's free choice."3 0
C. Speech "Plus"
Inevitably, in a discussion about picketing, the point is reached
where someone asks: "Does it really make sense to put the carrying
of signs on sticks in the same first amendment category with the
sort of utterance by a Sam Adams or a Patrick Henry or a John
Peter Zenger?" This question relates to the so-called "plus" element
in picketing, which causes picketing to be treated differently from
other modes of expression under the Constitution. Justice Douglas
has commented: "Picketing by an organized group is more than free
speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the
very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or an-
other, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated."31 As a form of physical activity, naturally, picketing
peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites).
SO Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 314 (1968). The dictum was voiced in an opinion in which a majority of the
Court likened a large commercial shopping center to a conventional municipal busi-
ness block, and held that union picketing of a nonunion retailer there was protected
under the first amendment. Id. at 324-25. The location of the picketing in Logan was
the critical issue, not the content of the message. Id. at 323-24. The decision repre-
sented an extension of the fairly narrow doctrine that private parties exercising cer-
tain "public functions" may be treated as if they were state agencies and thus may be
subject to constitutional limitations. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-10
(1948) (company town cannot forbid distribution of religious literature). Logan was
expressly overruled in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976), which held that
first amendment guarantees were not applicable to union picketing of a retail store in
a privately owned, enclosed shopping mall. Id. at 520-21. That, of course, did not
necessarily invalidate Justice Marshall's dictum concerning the substantive elements
of a constitutionally protected message when conveyed by picketing.
" Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942)
(Douglas, J., concurring). An even stronger statement is found in Justice Goldberg's
opinion for the Court in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). "We emphatically
reject the notion . . . that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same
kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrol-
ling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to
those who communicate ideas by pure speech." Id. at 555; see also International Bhd.
of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1957) (state may enjoin
peaceful picketing of business entrance which discourages business and has purpose
of coercing employer to compel employees to join union).
[Vol. XVI:883
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may be subject to trespass laws"2 and to reasonable rules governing
the use of public streets, in short, to the well recognized content-
neutral regulation of the time, place, or manner of expression."3 The
same would be true of any assemblage of persons listening to a
speech in the courthouse square, or engaging in a parade or other
popular demonstration. Furthermore, violent picketing or picketing
(like other utterances) "in a context of violence" has been held sub-
ject to prohibition. 34 None of this, however, has much to do with
picketing as a peaceful means of communication.
If picketing induces action without respect to the nature of the
ideas communicated, it is either because the conduct engenders
physical fear or a psychological reflex in the viewer, or because it
serves as a signal to trigger certain activity agreed upon beforehand
or accepted as conventional by picketer and viewer. Coercive picket-
ing is simply not typical of the kind of picketing with which this
discussion is concerned.36 On the other hand, if the actions or the
gestures of the pickets can properly be classified as physically
threatening or intimidating, then there is a problem in the law of
assault, not of the first amendment. Where picketing is a signal it
32E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978). State courts may be able to apply local trespass laws even to picket-
ing that is "arguably protected" under the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 205.
88 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (government
cannot selectively restrict certain kinds of speech, such as drive-in movies showing
nudity, on grounds of offensiveness); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 559, 562 (1965)
(free speech protections do not allow infringing public order by courthouse picketing);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949)
(statute forbidding sound trucks does not restrict free speech); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (regulating parades). The Supreme Court will gener-
ally strike down even time-place-manner regulation, however, if it discriminates on
the basis of the content of the communication. E.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
470 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 209; Police Dep't of the City
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972). See generally Blasi, Prior Restraints on
Demonstrations, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 1482, 1501-03 (1970). The ultimate inadequacy of
the Court's dichotomy of "pure speech/speech plus" in analyzing protest speech is
neatly pinned down in Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,
1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
[A]II speech is necessarily "speech plus." If it is oral, it is noise and may inter-
rupt someone else; if it is written, it may be litter .... [lI]n any theory, speech
has always been dependent on some commitment to order and etiquette. There
is, therefore, nothing novel in the vulnerability of protest speech to regulation on
this score.
Id. at 23.
" Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941).
See generally Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV.
513, 518 n.11 (1943); Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A Reply, 39 VA. L. REV. 1063,
1065 (1953).
19821
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would seem to be such only by designation and not by inherent
quality. An unfair list,"6 a red flag, a telephone call, or some other
kind of notice3 7 could also be so designated. 8
Conversely, picketing has no univocal meaning. It may, for in-
stance, be aimed only at enlisting consumer, and not employee, as-
sistance." It may, indeed, have nothing to do with a labor dispute at
all but rather be the instrument for a concerned group to protest
segregation 0 or cuts in welfare payments, or for a religious group to
protest objectionable motion pictures. In every case we are driven
back to evaluating the ends sought by the picketing (or other ap-
peal). Is the person addressed being asked to engage in illegal con-
duct or to induce someone else to engage in illegal conduct? To con-
centrate solely on the means whereby the signal or message is
transmitted serves only to becloud the issue.
Perhaps the most powerful objection to picketing's claims as pro-
tected speech is that it involves no intellectual appeal, no exchange
of ideas. It is mere sloganeering, or subtle psychological manipula-
tion (or not so subtle psychological arm twisting), or a combination
of the two. There is truth in that description, but I do not think it
goes to the essence of the activity. The first amendment was in-
tended to cover more than the elegant periods of our Abraham
Lincolns and Woodrow Wilsons. At worst, the cries "Unfair,"
"Scabs," and "Do Not Patronize" call for no more of a Pavlovian
response than the gaudy bumper stickers which urge readers to
"Vote Democratic" and "Vote Republican," or than such ancient
political battle cries as "Tippecanoe and Tyler too" and "540 40' or
Fight," not to mention the nastiness of "Rum, Romanism, and Re-
bellion.""' This is all part of our heritage of "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" '42 public discourse.
Furthermore, while one can sympathize with those who resent be-
ing accosted by strangers with peremptory demands, or being forced
', See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911).
' Cf. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 678 (1951)
(union ordered placing of picket to notify union members to leave job).
" See also supra note 18.
"9 See NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377
U.S. 58, 61 n.5 (1964); NLRB v. Crowley's Milk Co., 208 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1953).
40 Cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982) (black boycott of
white merchants).
" See generally, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HIsToRY 218, 227, 308 (R. Morris ed.
1976).
4 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) ("The language of the political arena,
like the language used in labor disputes ... is often vituperative, abusive, and
inexact.").
[Vol. XVI:883
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to make decisions under the gaze of a beady pair of eyes, on balance,
the existence of such mildly discomfiting social pressures should not
outweigh the speaker's right to deliver the message in person."3 We
must deal with such human encounters daily on our public streets,
from the religious proselytizer who distributes literature4 4 to the po-
litical candidate who approaches with an outstretched hand. True,
crossing a picket line might seem more hostile than rejecting a prof-
fered leaflet or handshake, but this is a matter of immaterial degree.
At any rate, once physical fear is set aside, there is no basis for a
constitutional distinction between the handbiller and the picketer.
Each has the capacity to confront us with an accusing pair of eyes.
This does not mean that picketing for a certain object may not be
outlawed unless every other method of achieving the object is also
forbidden. Undoubtedly government may, as the Supreme Court has
declared, "direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually
exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may
do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind
from those that are allowed."' 5 Nevertheless, if the object or mes-
'" See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (racially
integrated community organization accused real estate agent of "blockbusting" and
distributed leaflets near his home in effort to force him to change his practices).
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that peaceful pamphleteering may be pro-
tected by the first amendment even though the handbillers are "offensive" and intend
in some sense a "coercive impact" on the target of their leaflets. Id. Arguably the
ultimate example of a person4)ly delivered and offensively worded peremptory de-
mand was presented by the young man who, during the Vietnam era, donned a jacket
with the plainly visible words, "F-- the Draft," and sauntered about in such public
places as the county courthouse. Despite this flaunting of the inscription in a way
hardly different from the usual "sandwich-type" picket sign, Justice Harlan for the
Court declared: "The only 'conduct' which the State sought to punish is the fact of
communication." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (emphasis supplied). A
conviction for disturbing the peace by "offensive conduct" was reversed. Id. at 26; see
also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424 (1982) ("Speech does
not lose its protected character, however, simply because it may embarrass others or
coerce them into action.").
" See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (distributing printed materials
on street permissible); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (freedom of press and
speech includes distribution of religious pamphlets); cf. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943) (ban on residential solicitation invalid as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses).
, Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 468 (1950). Some language of Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Hughes is at odds with this author's thesis, in that it sug-
gests there is a compulsive quality inherent in picketing which makes it peculiarly
vulnerable to restriction. Id. Yet elsewhere the opinion states that picketing is subject
to government control if "the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its
disallowance," thereby placing the case squarely within the rationale of Giboney. See
id. at 465-66. The Supreme Court of California, whose judgment was affirmed in
Hughes, had declared expressly that the picketing could be enjoined because it was
for the "specific unlawful purpose" of compelling an employer to adopt a racial quota
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sage of the picketing is constitutionally beyond the reach of the leg-
islature, so too is peaceful, orderly picketing to secure the object or
spread the message. Surely different treatment would not be war-
ranted just because picketing may be the most visible and efficacious
way for working people to get their message across to their intended
audience at the crucial moment of decision.4
III. CONSUMER BOYCOTTS AND INDIVIDUAL APPEALS
A. Through Tree Fruits and Mosley
It is commonplace in Anglo-American jurisprudence that acts in-
nocent in themselves may become illegal if done in concert or pursu-
ant to an agreement.4 The individual employee who is not subject
to a term contract may quit work with impunity." Yet in the early
nineteenth century it was a criminal conspiracy for a group of work-
ers to band together and refuse as a unit to perform services for
their employer. 49 Even today our society does not hesitate to pro-
hibit strikes or concerted work stoppages on the part of most public
sector employees6" and on the part of private sector employees
under certain circumstances,5 1 even though it would be almost un-
in his hiring, contrary to the state's antidiscriminatory public policy. 32 Cal. 2d 850,
856, 198 P.2d 885, 889 (1948). Justices Black, Minton, and Reed concurred in Hughes
solely on the basis that Giboney controlled. 339 U.S. at 469 (Black, Minton, Reed,
JJ., concurring). Justice Douglas did not participate.
46 Cf. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775
(1942) (Douglas, J., concurring) (querying whether a state "can prohibit picketing
when it is effective but may not prohibit it when it is ineffective").
47 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3436 (1982). Speaking
for the Court, Justice Stevens observed: "Concerted action is a powerful weapon. His-
tory teaches that special dangers are associated with conspiratorial activity." Id.; cf.
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(" 'Privy conspiracy' ranks with sedition and rebellion in the Litany's prayer for
deliverance").
41 H. WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272-73 (1877); Feinman, The Develop-
ment of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118, 124-25 (1976).
19 E.g., Commonwealth v. Pullis [Philadelphia Cordwainers] (Phil. Mayor's Ct.
1806), in 3 Doc. HIsT. AM. IND. SOC. 59 (J. Commons 2d ed. 1910); see also Vegelahn
v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 97, 44 N.E. 1077, 1077 (1896) (civil conspiracy when two
men patrol place of business to prevent workmen from entering).
" See H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 567, 572 (1979) (noting that as of 1979, only about eight or nine states gave
any of their employees even a limited right to strike).
5' See, e.g., Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144,
151-167, 171-183, 557 (1976) (in §§ 176-180, Act authorizes 80-day federal injunction
against so-called national emergency strikes that would imperil national health or
safety); see also infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text ("secondary" strikes are
also forbidden).
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thinkable to outlaw individual refusals to work by those same em-
ployees. A healthy instinct is in evidence here. We have an abiding
fear of both the mob and the regimented group, and of the way their
unleashed forces can crush the solitary object of their wrath. Over
time, however, we have become more sophisticated in our assess-
ments of relative strengths, and now we know that certain per-
sons-rank-and-file workers and racial minorities-may need the
sustenance of the group if they are to achieve a measure of equality
in dealing with their employers and the community.2 Much of our
modern labor and social legislation is grounded on that premise.
Nowhere has the effort to achieve an appropriate balance of power
between individuals and groups in the labor field caused more diffi-
culty than in the regulation of the secondary boycott. To return to
the opening hypothetical, the shoe manufacturer, Fashion Footwear,
would be referred to as the primary party, because it is the em-
ployer directly involved in the labor dispute with Shoemakers Local
100. Retail distributors of Fashion Manufacturers' products, such as
the boutique where the young woman intended to buy the shoes,
would be considered neutral or secondary parties because they have
no personal stake in the outcome of the dispute. Under the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947,58 unions were forbidden to engage in secondary
boycotts by causing employees of secondary establishments such as
the boutique to strike their employer in an attempt to force it to
cease doing business with a primary party such as Fashion Manufac-
turers.Y On the other hand, the Act did not affect a pure consumer
boycott, such as the appeal to the young woman not to purchase
Fashion Manufacturers' products.5
In 1959, when the Landrum-Griffin amendments were added to
the National Labor Relations Act, Congress made it an unfair labor
8 See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934) (remarks of Senator Wagner) ("Genuine
collective bargaining is the only way to attain equality of bargaining power"); 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (findings and declaration of policy for collective bargaining).
'3 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, amended by Labor Manage-
ment Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-183, 557 (1976)).
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B). A classic study is Lesnick, The Gravamen of the
Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1962); see also Goetz, Secondary Boy-
cotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the Swamp, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 651 (1971); St.
Antoine, What Makes Boycotts Secondary? in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION,
LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS-PRoCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
LABOR LAW 5 (1965).
" See United Wholesale & Warehouse Employees Local 261 v. NLRB, 282 F.2d
824, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (picketing by union against manufacturers does not necessa-
rily induce retailer's employees to strike); NLRB v. Crowley's Milk Co., 208 F.2d 444,
446-47 (3d Cir. 1953) (proper for NLRB to order reinstatement of striking employee
who engaged in secondary boycott to affect customers, not other employees).
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practice for a union to "threaten, coerce, or restrain" a neutral firm
to force it to stop dealing with a primary party." Initially it appears
that this new language was intended to cover only physical coercion
or economic threats by a union directly against a secondary em-
ployer,5 7 which previously would not have been reached because no
work refusals by employees were involved. As a result of some rather
bizarre backstage legislative maneuvers, 6 however, it developed as
part of the statutory history that the phrase "threaten, coerce, or
restrain" would apply to at least some types of consumer boycotts.
At this point the bill's floor manager in the Senate, John Kennedy,
and others became concerned about the constitutional implications
of prohibiting unions from appealing to individual customers to re-
frain from patronizing secondary establishments. 9 They thereupon
succeeded in engrafting a special proviso onto the revised boycott
ban. The proviso excepted from the ban "publicity, other than pick-
eting," which advised the public that nonunion primary products
were being distributed by a secondary employer.6s
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976).
C, See 105 CONG. REc. 14,347, 15,532 (1959) (remarks of Representative Griffin con-
cerning "economic retaliation," "labor trouble").
" See generally N.Y. Times, August 7, 1959, at 8, col. 6 (discussing presidential
comments on secondary boycotts while Congress debated Landrum-Griffin Act). In a
radio and television appeal for "an effective labor reform law" while the Landrum-
Griffin Act was being debated, President Eisenhower gave the following example of a
"secondary boycott" abuse: "Take another company-let us say a furniture manufac-
turer. The employees vote against joining a particular union. Instead of picketing the
furniture plant itself, they picket the stores which sell the furniture this plant manu-
factures." Id. The illustration could well have referred to a garden variety appeal for
a secondary strike by store employees. But that would have meant the President was
unaware that the Taft-Hartley Act had outlawed such conduct twelve years earlier.
The solution for the Landrum-Griffin sponsors was to insist that "threaten, coerce, or
restrain" now covered the inducement of a secondary consumer boycott. See Cox,
The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN.
L. REV. 257, 274 (1959) (discussing President's message and relation to consumer
boycotts).
69 See 105 CONG. REc. 16,591 (1959) (analysis of Senator Kennedy and Representa-
tive Thompson); id. at 17,882-83 (remarks of Senator Morse).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976) (emphasis supplied). Senatory Kennedy ex-
plained that under the proviso a union "can hand out handbills at the shop, can place
advertisements in newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can
carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary
site." 105 CONG. REc. 17,899 (1959). Although the proviso is phrased in terms of in-
forming customers about the nonunion nature of the primary product, the legislative
history establishes that nonpicketing publicity may be used to seek a buyers' boycott
of the secondary business itself. Thus, Senator Kennedy said that the Senate confer-
ees insisted on a union's right "to appeal to consumers . . . to refrain from trading
with a retailer who sells such [nonunion] goods." Id. at 17,898; see Middle South
Broadcasting Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1698 (1961).
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In a famous case, NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers Local
760,61 universally known as Tree Fruits, the Supreme Court gave a
narrow and rather strained reading to the new prohibitory language.
A union picketed a grocery chain urging customers not to buy non-
union apples sold by the chain.6 2 The pickets took pains to inform
customers that they intended no general boycott of the stores them-
selves.'5 Since the union was concededly engaged in picketing, the
publicity proviso of the secondary boycott provision was plainly in-
applicable. Nevertheless, a majority of the Court held the picketing
lawful.6 4 The Court first rejected any negative inference from the
terms of the proviso, asserting that exclusion from the proviso did
not necessarily mean inclusion within the prohibition." Focusing on
the general prohibition itself, the Court then drew a distinction be-
tween appeals to customers not to buy one of many items carried by
the stores and appeals to customers not to patronize the stores at
all.6 6 The limited product boycott did not "threaten, coerce, or re-
strain" the secondary retailer, whereas a total embargo of the chain
itself would. Only the most slender legislative history, however, sup-
ported such a distinction. What must have been troubling the
Court was the "concern that a broad ban against peaceful picketing
might collide with the guarantees of the first amendment."'6
In a concurring opinion, blunt, forthright Justice Black took quite
another tack. Concluding that Congress had intended to prohibit
secondary consumer picketing of the sort at issue in Tree Fruits, he
construed the statute as unconstitutional.6 He stated:
41 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
' Id. at 60.
' Id. at 61.
Id. at 71-72.
6 Id. at 63.
Id. at 69-71.
07 See, e.g., 377 U.S. at 70 (discussing legislative history of Landrum-Griffin
amendments). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, derived comfort from a stra-
tegically placed conjunction - he emphasized that Senator Kennedy meant to pre-
serve the union's "right to appeal to consumers by methods other than picketing ask-
ing them to refrain from buying goods made by nonunion labor and to refrain from
trading with a retailer who sells such goods." Id. (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 17,898
(1959)) (emphasis the Court's). The inference was that, since the proviso regarding
nonpicketing publicity protected even a total boycott of the secondary retailer, above
and beyond a boycott of the primary product, the general prohibition may only have
been intended to reach such a total boycott of the retailer. But see Lewis, Consumer
Picketing and the Court-The Questionable Yield of Tree Fruits, 49 MINN. L. REv.
479, 500-01 (1965) (Congress never considered such differentiated categories of con-
sumer boycotts).
" 377 U.S. at 63.
" Id. at 76 (Black, J., concurring).
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In short, we have neither a case in which picketing is banned because
the picketers are asking others to do something unlawful nor a case in
which all picketing is, for reasons of public order, banned. Instead, we
have a case in which picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only when
the picketers express particular views. The result is an abridgment of
the freedom of these picketers to tell a part of the public their side of a
labor controversy, a subject the free discussion of which is protected by
the First Amendment.
70
Although Justice Black spoke pointedly about what the majority of
the Court only hinted at, subsequent developments suggested that
his approach might prevail. The Court was to assert that peaceful
and orderly picketing, which requested only the performance of a
lawful act, could not be suppressed because of the "particular views"
expressed. The content of the message of such picketing would be
no basis for drawing lines between the permissible and the
impermissible.
The next major case, Police Department of the City of Chicago v.
Mosley,7' did not involve labor picketing. That fact turned out to be
the key to the case. A Chicago ordinance forbade picketing next to
any school while it was in session, but exempted "peaceful picketing
of any school involved in a labor dispute. 7 2 The prohibition was
challenged by a person who wished to picket in protest of alleged
racial discrimination at a school.73 The Supreme Court struck down
the ordinance primarily on the basis of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment (although the first amendment was
"intertwined") 74 because it made "an impermissible distinction be-
tween labor and other peaceful picketing.1 75 Justice Marshall, for
the Court, identified the "central problem" as the classification by
the ordinance of "permissible picketing in terms of its subject mat-
ter. . . . The operative distinction is the message on a picket
sign."' 76 He concluded that the "First Amendment means that gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. 7 7 He summed up by de-
claring that the "essence" of "forbidden censorship" was "content
70 Id. at 79 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis in the original).
7- 408 U.S. 92 (1972); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (holding invalid
state statute making it unlawful "to picket before or about the residence or dwelling
of any person" but excepting "peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved
in a labor dispute").
7' 408 U.S. at 94 n.2 (quoting CHICAGO MUNI. CODE ch. 193-1(i) (1968)).
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control. "78
Justice Marshall's statements on "content control" in Mosley can-
not be taken at face value. As he would undoubtedly recognize, all
the decisions which have found a union guilty of an unfair labor
practice for instigating a forbidden secondary boycott by employees
have turned on an analysis of the content of the message conveyed
by the picketing or by whatever other medium was employed.79 A
more precise formulation of the "content" principle was articulated
by Justice Black: peaceful, orderly picketing which solicits only law-
ful action cannot be forbidden because of the content of the commu-
nication. 0 Although many would have no problem accepting the fur-
ther qualification that the message could also be held actionable as
libel, obscenity, or the like,"1 Justice Black would disavow such a
concession." But even with this additional refinement of the con-
cept, the most recent steps taken by the Supreme Court cast doubt
on the continuing vitality of the notion that content-based distinc-
tions among picketing are unconstitutional.
B. Safeco and Beyond
Tree Fruits, which held that the 1959 boycott amendments did
not forbid consumer picketing directed against one of many primary
products handled by a secondary retailer, as distinguished from
picketing directed against the retailer itself, left at least two major
questions unanswered. First, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
would the antiboycott provisions apply to picketing of a primary
product if the product constituted all or a substantial part of the
secondary retailer's business even though the retailer was not made
" Id. at 96.
79E.g., ILA v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1656 (1982); IBEW Local 501 v. NLRB,
341 U.S. 694 (1951); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(1951).
So See supra note 70.
81 Cf. Linn v. United Plant Guards Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (libelous union
leaflet actionable if malicious and injurious); see also Letter Carriers Branch 496 v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
82 Cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., concur-
ring) ("The First Amendment does not permit the recovery of libel judgments against
the news media even when statements are broadcast with knowledge they are false.");
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (possession of
"obscene" books by bookseller is protected by first amendment); Black & Cahn, Jus-
tice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
549, 557-59 (1962) (libel and obscenity). For all his vigilance against limitations on
speech, including picketing, on the basis of content, Justice Black strongly espoused
the view that picketing is also "conduct" and "as conduct can be regulated or prohib-
ited." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 559, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in No. 24
and dissenting in No. 49).
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the named target of the picketing? This would be the case, for ex-
ample, if the young woman in the opening hypothetical had gone to
a shoe store which handled nothing but Fashion Manufacturers'
products. Second, as a matter of constitutional free speech, could a
union be forbidden to engage in peaceful and orderly picketing
which asked individual members of the consuming public to refrain
either from purchasing a primary product under any of these cir-
cumstances or from patronizing the retailer entirely?
The Supreme Court came to grips with these issues in NLRB v.
Retail Clerks Local 1001 [Safeco].83 A 6-3 majority held that picket-
ing for the purpose of asking consumers not to buy a nonunion
product which a second party was distributing was an unlawful boy-
cott where the distributor derived ninety percent of its income from
the sales of the picketed product.84 Whatever the merits of this stat-
utory decision, it is not dispositive of the constitutional aspects of
free speech. Justice Powell, speaking for himself, Chief Justice Bur-
ger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stewart, discussed this constitu-
tional question in a single paragraph." This hardly seems adequate
for resolving the conundrums bequeathed us by forty years of litiga-
tion and debate over the constitutional status of picketing.
Justice Powell began with the dubious assertion that Tree Fruits
"left no doubt that Congress may prohibit secondary picketing cal-
culated 'to persuade the customers of the secondary employer to
cease trading with him in order to force him to cease dealing with,
or to put pressure upon, the primary employer' "86 In fact, in the
passage Justice Powell quoted from Tree Fruits, the Court was
merely stating what it thought Congress had and had not done. The
opinion was notably circumspect about prejudging the constitution-
ally allowable limits of restraints on peaceful consumer picketing.
Justice Powell continued by citing one of the early Taft-Hartley em-
ployee secondary boycott cases for the proposition that a prohibition
on picketing designed to further some unlawful objective did not vi-
olate the first amendment.87 He concluded brusquely that there was
no reason to retreat from that well-established understanding.8 No-
where in the opinion is there the slightest indication that the prece-
dents Justice Powell relied upon were distinguishable in that they
dealt with appeals for concerted employee action or action by union-
83 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
" Id. at 615-16.
so Id. at 616.
8' See id. (quoting NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 [Tree Fruits],
377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964)).
0' Id. (quoting IBEW Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951)).
88 Id.
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ized workers presumably subject to group loyalties and discipline.
Moreover, there was no reference to the fact that Safeco was the
first time the Supreme Court had ever clearly sustained a ban on
peaceful and orderly picketing addressed to, and calling for seem-
ingly lawful responses by, individual consumers acting on their own.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens did not subscribe to Justice Pow-
ell's free speech analysis, thereby leaving the Court without a major-
ity opinion on the constitutional question. These two Justices may
be applauded for recognizing that the Powell plurality's "cursory
discussion" 9 of difficult first amendment issues failed to take into
account accepted precedent bearing on the constitutionality of a
content-based prohibition on peaceful picketing of secondary em-
ployers.90 Unfortunately, their own separate efforts also leave much
to be desired. Both Justices Blackmun and Stevens seem willing to
allow some content selectivity in restrictions on picketing despite
Mosley, the Chicago school picketing case. Thereafter their paths
diverge. Justice Blackmun winds up rather lamely: "I am reluctant
to hold unconstitutional Congress' striking of the delicate balance
between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral em-
ployers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced par-
ticipation in industrial strife." 9 1 To return once more to the opening
hypothetical, was our young woman necessarily coerced when she
turned away from the boutique? Where is the evidence on this cru-
cial point?
Justice Stevens digs deeper, if ultimately to little more effect. He
first emphasizes that in labor picketing it is the conduct element
rather than the specific idea being expressed that is often the per-
suasive deterrent to potential customers.9 2 Curiously, he does not
specify whether the conduct element is the large sign, the stick, the
physical presence of the picketer, or some combination of these fac-
tors. One might have considered the picketer the likeliest candidate,
but Justice Stevens continues: "Indeed, no doubt the principal rea-
son why handbills containing the same message are so much less ef-
fective than labor picketing is that the former depend entirely on
the persuasive force of the idea.""9 Since the selfsame person can
obviously be either handbiller or picketer, and can glare just as omi-
nously in one capacity as in the other, Justice Stevens seems to be
abandoning the element of human confrontation and attendant psy-
s1 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in result); id. at 618 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and concurring in result).
" Id. at 617-18.
I /d.
" Id. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in result).
93 Id. (emphasis supplied).
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chological pressure as the key to the conduct element in picketing.
Does it then come down to the sign on a stick?. If we prescind from
the possible use of the stick as a weapon, and for the purposes of an
article on peaceful picketing we must, it would seem improper to
conclude that because the picketer's placard is more visible, and
thus more effective in catching the eye in a fast moving crowd, it
therefore becomes more susceptible to regulation than other forms
of speech."'
Justice Stevens next harks back to an old distinction between a
"signal" and "publicity,""5 and stresses that the statutory ban af-
fects the union's communication only insofar as it "calls for an auto-
matic response to a signal, rather than a reasoned response to an
idea."" The concept of picketing as a signal or an order, however,
was developed in cases dealing with unionized workers, where the
picketing was indeed like a directive to an organized group. Except
in unusual circumstances, the notion of an automatic response to a
signal does not square with the realities of picketing addressed to
the atomized and heterogeneous membership of a pluralistic society
circulating on a crowded city street. To the extent that Justice Ste-
vens' emphasis is on an automatic response to a cryptic "Unfair," as
distinct from a reasoned response to a long list of particularized
grievances, I can only restate my belief that a political party's two-
word bumper sticker is as much protected by the first amendment
as the elaborate platform adopted at its national convention."
Finally, almost as an afterthought, Justice Stevens remarks: "And
the restriction on picketing is limited in geographical scope to sites
of neutrals in the labor dispute.""8 In some respects, this seems to be
the most appealing argument of all. At first blush it is not a pure
content-based rationale, but partakes more of the acceptable regula-
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
" 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring); cf. Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the
Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 595, 602 (1951) (discussing means by which em-
ployees may bargain with employers). According to Cox, "The constitutional deci-
sions in picketing cases should depend, in part, on whether the "publicity" or "sig-
nal" aspect predominates .... Id. at 595. In addition, Cox believes that "[tihe
critical inquiry is whether the employees' conduct involves an appeal to an uncoerced
audience each individual in which is left free to choose his own course of conduct or
invokes the power of an organized combination." Id. at 602.
447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting jacket that proclaimed
"F-- the Draft"). The Supreme Court has even extended first amendment protec-
tions to such nonverbal, "symbolic speech" as the wearing of black armbands to pro-
test the Vietnam War. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 514 (1969).
1- 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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tion of the time, place, and manner9 9 of picketing as a species of
physical conduct. One can appreciate an effort to reduce the clutter
and confusion of the teeming urban landscape, including the con-
finement of certain patrolling to certain locations. That is not, how-
ever, the real function of the secondary picketing ban. Secondary
handbilling could continue at the neutral site. Picketing that would
be primary as to the same establishment might proceed unimpeded.
Only picketing which expresses particular views-a secondary ap-
peal-would be restricted. This is the fatal flaw. The geographical
justification, therefore, fails as well.
Perhaps the barrenness of Safeco as a constitutional document is
best epitomized by the approach of the three dissenters, Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and White. They do not even attempt to grapple
with the challenge of the first amendment. Instead, they content
themselves with the statutory argument that the NLRA does not
forbid consumer picketing which is aimed solely at a nonunion prod-
uct rather than at the neutral distributor's business as such, regard-
less of how large a percentage of the neutral's business is repre-
sented by the nonunion product."'0 That statutory position,
however, as noted earlier, is only tangential to our central theme.
Safeco comes close to being an unreasoned decision on the issue of
picketing as free speech. It is constitutional law by fiat. Because the
Supreme Court has the last word on the Constitution, its fiats pre-
vail. Yet, without a principled foundation, they tend not to endure.
Up to this time, there have not been five Justices in agreement on a
rationale for the constitutional proscription of peaceful secondary
consumer picketing. In all probability, we have not seen the end of
this debate.
Archibald Cox, while recognizing the deficiencies of the various
opinions in Safeco, has suggested that the decision "can be fitted
into the body of first amendment law if picketing is classified with
commercial advertising as economic speech."' 0 1 There is logic in that
position, and if labor picketing were being classified for the first
time, its bracketing with commercial utterance might not seem im-
plausible. At this late date, however, that categorization would be
out of step with the main line of both constitutional and statutory
" See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing regulation of time, place,
and manner of picketing).
100 447 U.S. at 622-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1*01 A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 47 (1980). Professor Cox goes on to point out
that the four-part test enunciated in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), "permits a content-based restriction upon com-
mercial advertising when it 'directly advances' a 'substantial government interest' and
'is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.'" Id. at 564-66.
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treatment of the activities of working people, including their appeals
for support through picketing. Two years after Thornhill v. Ala-
bama1 0 2 the Supreme Court held that commercial advertising does
not enjoy first amendment protections, and that remained true dur-
ing the heyday of picketing as free speech."0 3 It would be anomalous,
at least, if the recent extension of some constitutional safeguards to
commercial advertising' 0" should be accompanied by their contrac-
tion in the case of union picketing.
Much more fundamentally, however, it is wrong to equate picket-
ing by employees who seek to organize or improve their working
conditions with advertising to sell soap, automobiles, or even
pharmaceuticals.'0 5 Although its operational significance may have
proved slight, section 6 of the Clayton Act is still a reminder of the
pervasive congressional premise that "the labor of a human being is
not a commodity or article of commerce."'" So too, the Supreme
Court has long realized through its experience with the antitrust
laws, that activity in the labor market-the setting of wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment-must be placed on
an entirely different footing from activity in the product market,
that is, the commercial sale of goods and services. 0 7 Perhaps most
102 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
103 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
1*1 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
557, 562 (1980); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762-63 (1976).
'" But see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424-26 (1982)
(Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, seems to treat Safeco as a case of "economic
regulation").
'" Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976)).
I do not mean to suggest, of course, that a mere legislative classification of "human
labor" would be binding on a later Congress, specifically, on the Congress that added
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to the NLRA in the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments. 73
Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). In my view, however, section 6 of
the Clayton Act is more properly to be regarded as a congressional recognition of
what I would term a "constitutional fact." By that I mean a characterization of a
particular situation or state of affairs which is crucial to establishing the validity of a
claim of constitutional right, and which is therefore a matter for ultimate determina-
tion by the Supreme Court and not the legislature. Ready examples of "constitutional
facts" include "clear and present danger" and the "equality" or "inequality" of "sep-
arateness" in public facilities. Cf. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 842-44 (1978); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also
Kamisar, Panel Discussion, in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRiBE, THE SUPREME
COURT: TRENDS AND DEvELOPMENTS 1980-1981 257 (1982) ("almost every constitu-
tional holding rests on certain factual judgments or assumptions").
11 E.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975); Meat
Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 495, 503 (1940).
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significant of all, the right of employees to form labor unions is now
explicitly recognized, as it had not yet been recognized at the time
of Thornhill, as an exercise of the freedom of assembly or associa-
tion protected by the first amendment.'" Unless there is a basic re-
evaluation of the status of organized labor, it is incongruous to re-
duce its public appeals to the level of ordinary commercial
discourse.
IV. CONCLUSION
The message of this essay is alarmingly simple. Were it not so
hotly controverted, presenting it would hardly seem worth the
bother. My thesis is that the core of picketing is communication,
and that as a means of communication, picketing is entitled to every
constitutional protection afforded any other means of communica-
tion. To the extent that particular picketing may properly be subject
to regulation or prohibition, it is because of elements that would
similarly subject other particular communications to regulation or
prohibition. To be more specific:
1. Picketing involves physical activity, just like the orator on the
soapbox in the public square or the loudspeaker atop the truck on
the public street. As such, picketing is of course subject to time,
place, and manner regulation, including laws against violence, physi-
cal coercion, obstruction, or trespass.
2. The content of the picketer's message is also subject to regula-
tion, as long as the usual "clear and present danger" or "incitement"
standards are met. If the end sought is unlawful, the picketing may
be restrained. Libel and obscenity laws should similarly apply.
3. To speak of "signals" and "automatic responses" is more con-
clusory than analytical. The question is, a signal, order or request to
whom to do what? It is one thing for a picket line to address a group
of building trades unionists approaching a construction site, and
quite another to address one isolated but self-possessed young wo-
man on a Boston sidewalk. Further, trying to distinguish between
'" See American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Woodward, 406
F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969) (public employees); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287
(7th Cir. 1968) (public employees); cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (public
school teachers' freedom of association); see also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 5 (1964) ("the first amendment's guarantees of free speech, peti-
tion and assembly give railroad workers the right to gather together for the lawful
purpose of helping and advising one another in asserting the rights Congress gave
them in the Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act");
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530-32, 540 (1945) (requirement of registration
before making public speech soliciting support for labor union violates rights of free
speech and free assembly).
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automatic and reasoned responses can be a treacherous exercise.
Does the Republican or Democratic bumper sticker seek a "rea-
soned" response from the rock-ribbed New England Yankee or the
unreconstructed Southern rebel?
To accept everything propounded in this article concerning the
nature of picketing is not to resolve all the knotty problems about
the legality of such substantive activities as consumer boycotts; it is
only to channel the inquiry. Picketing becomes a side issue. The fo-
cus, then, becomes the other teasing questions: should there, for ex-
ample, be a distinction, regardless of the means used, between seek-
ing a concerted refusal to deal and merely inducing third parties
individually not to patronize in the context of a consumer or politi-
cal boycott? 109 These issues will be left for another day. At least we
shall have made progress by advancing the proposition that if up-
per-middle-class consumer groups can freely use their natural means
of communication, the media, in rallying public support, then work-
ing men and women should be no less free to use theirs, the picket
line.
For differing analyses of "protest boycotts" under the first amendment and the
antitrust laws, compare Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment,
91 HARV. L. Rzy. 659 (1978) with Note, Protest Boycotts under the Sherman Act, 120
U. PA. L. REv. 1131 (1980). In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409
(1982), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state court's damage judgment
insofar as it may have reached the nonviolent participation by civil rights groups in a
boycott of white merchants aimed at desegregating a variety of public facilities.
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